Credit Card Surcharge Litigation Update

Impact of the Recent United States Supreme Court Decisions on Credit Card Surcharge Bans

NACM Webinar
May 1, 2017

Presented By:

Wanda Borges, Esq.
Borges & Associates LLC
516-677-8200 x 225
wborges@borgeslawllc.com

Bruce S. Nathan, Esq.
Lowenstein Sandler LLP
212-204-8686
bnathan@lowenstein.com

Andrew Behlmann, Esq.
Lowenstein Sandler LLP
973-597-2332
abehlmann@lowenstein.com
Overview

• B2B Credit Card Acceptance
• Interchange Fee Settlement
• Refresher on Surcharge Rules
• Surcharge Ban Litigation – What’s Happening?
  • New York (Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman)
  • Florida (Dana’s Railroad Supply v. Bondi)
  • Texas (Rowell v. Pettijohn)
• Where are we going from here?
B2B Credit Card Acceptance - Reasons

• Becoming increasingly common
• **Customers want it**
  • Working capital management
  • Points / miles / other benefits programs
  • Simplified accounting (one check to write)
• **Sellers can benefit from it**
  • Faster payment and settlement – 24-48 hours
  • Lower risk of payment default
  • *But: Risk of chargebacks; possible liquidity issues*
B2B Credit Card Acceptance - Fees

- Accepting credit cards is not free! Total cost of credit card acceptance includes a variety of fees that can potentially be passed on to customers as a surcharge:

  - **Interchange Fees and Assessments**
    - Fees the issuing bank and credit card networks charge for each transaction
    - Typically a percentage plus a small flat fee
    - Often marked up by processors
    - Network fees – e.g. Visa FANF

  - **Processor Fees**
    - Terminal fees, PCI compliance fees, annual fees, payment gateway fees, monthly fees, minimums
## B2B Credit Card Acceptance – Fees (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Card Brand</th>
<th>Average Fees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mastercard</td>
<td>1.55% - 2.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visa</td>
<td>1.43% - 2.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discover</td>
<td>1.56% - 2.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Express</td>
<td>2.50% - 5.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Before 2013, Visa and Mastercard network rules prohibited passing these fees on to customers in the form of a surcharge.

$40 Billion Annually
Visa/MasterCard Interchange Fee Litigation
2005 Class Action Lawsuit

• Merchants sued Visa, MasterCard, and acquiring banks in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging various antitrust violations:
  • Price fixing to keep fees high
  • Monopolization
  • No competition to drive fees down
  • Restrictions on “price signaling”
Visa/MasterCard Interchange Fee Litigation
2005 Class Action Lawsuit

• Primary issue was the “no surcharge rule” – Visa and MasterCard forbade merchants from passing the costs of credit card acceptance on to customers in the form of a surcharge
Visa/MasterCard Interchange Fee Litigation
Class Action Settlement

- Largest U.S. antitrust settlement in history, reached in November 2012 subject to court approval
- $6 Billion in cash to merchants who accepted Visa/MC prior to November 28, 2012
- Eight-month processing fee reprieve worth approximately $1.2 billion
- **New changes to Visa / MasterCard network rules allowing merchants to pass on credit card acceptance fees and costs to customers in the form of a surcharge**
- Approved by the District Court in December 2013
Visa/MasterCard Customer Surcharge
How Is It Calculated?

- Cannot exceed cost of acceptance
- Maximum surcharge: 4%
- Must surcharge Visa / MC on the same terms and conditions as equal or higher cost cards with limitations
- Credit card transactions only (no surcharge allowed on debit card sales)
Visa/MasterCard Customer Surcharge
Other Surcharge Rules

• Must notify Visa / MC and processor or acquirer 30 days before beginning to surcharge

• Must provide conspicuous notice to customers at the point of entry and point of payment
  • E.g., “We impose a surcharge on credit card payments that is not greater than our cost of acceptance.”

• Surcharge must be a separate line item on the customer’s receipt
Visa/MasterCard Interchange Fee Litigation
Class Action Settlement

- Settlement faced heavy opposition by several trade groups, big box retailers, and hundreds of smaller retailers
- A group of merchants that opposed the settlement appealed District Court order approving the settlement
- Second Circuit Court of Appeals overturned settlement approval in June 2016
- Supreme Court denied certiorari in March 2016, leaving the Second Circuit’s ruling intact
Visa/MasterCard Interchange Fee Litigation
Class Action Settlement

- The parties are essentially back to the drawing board to craft a new settlement
- Likely several years before a new settlement is reached, executed, approved, and consummated, but . . .
- Changes to Visa and MasterCard network rules permitting surcharging remain in effect for the time being, and will likely remain a component of any new settlement reached once new class representatives and counsel are appointed
Surcharge Restrictions

- Ten states and Puerto Rico have passed laws restricting or prohibiting credit card surcharges:
  - CA, CO, CT, FL, KS, MA, ME, NY, OK, TX
- Twenty other states considered bans but ultimately lost momentum
  - *How do these laws apply to B2B?*
# Credit Card Surcharges

## Legal Concerns – State Surcharge Bans (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Prohibited For</th>
<th>Cards</th>
<th>Discount for Cash Payment?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>“retailers”</td>
<td>Credit</td>
<td>“A retailer may . . . offer discounts for the purpose of inducing payment by cash, check, or other means not involving the use of a credit card, provided that the discount is offered to all prospective buyers.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>“sellers”</td>
<td>Credit</td>
<td>“Discounts offered to induce payment by cash, check or other means not involving credit card are not finance charges if offered to all prospective buyers and disclosed clearly and conspicuously in accordance with regulations.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>“sellers”</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>No reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FL</td>
<td>“sellers” or “consumer retailers”</td>
<td>Credit</td>
<td>“[D]oes not apply to the offering of a discount for the purpose of inducing payment by cash, check, or other means not involving the use of a credit card, if the discount is offered to all prospective customers.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KS</td>
<td>“sellers” or “credit card issuers”</td>
<td>Credit</td>
<td>Kansas Attorney General Opinion No. 86-115 found cash discounts permissible under the predecessor to the current surcharge law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>“sellers”</td>
<td>Credit</td>
<td>“[A]ny discount from the regular price offered by the seller for the purpose of inducing payment by cash, check or other means not involving the use of . . . A credit card shall not constitute a finance charge . . . If such discount is offered to all prospective buyers and its availability is disclosed clearly and conspicuously.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ME</td>
<td>“sellers”</td>
<td>Credit Debit</td>
<td>“A discount or reduction from the regular price is not a surcharge.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NY</td>
<td>“sellers”</td>
<td>Credit</td>
<td>Previously did not appear to be permitted — NY Attorney General’s legal pleadings suggest that cash discounts are considered acceptable under NY law even though not expressly permitted. Dual pricing permissible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OK</td>
<td>Prohibited for “sellers”</td>
<td>Credit</td>
<td>“[A] discount which a seller offers, allows or otherwise makes available for the purpose of inducing payment by cash, check or similar means rather than by use of an open-end credit card account shall not constitute a credit service charge . . . If the discount is offered to all prospective buyers clearly and conspicuously in accordance with regulations of the Administrator of Consumer Affairs.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TX</td>
<td>Prohibited for “sellers”</td>
<td>Does not appear to be permitted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Credit Card Surcharges
New York Surcharge Ban

New York General Business Law § 518 prohibits credit card surcharges by “Sellers” – “Seller” = a person who honors credit or debit cards for the purchase or lease of property or services

• **Surcharging is a misdemeanor crime punishable by a fine of up to $500 and/or 1 year in jail (!)**

• Legislative history re: discounts for cash, check, or other non-credit card payment
Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman

- June 2013: Group of retailers sued the New York AG, seeking to enjoin enforcement of NY surcharge ban
- District Court held that § 518 was an unconstitutional restriction of merchants’ commercial speech to their customers
  - “virtually incomprehensible distinction between what a vendor can and cannot tell its customers”
Credit Card Surcharges
New York Surcharge Ban

Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman
• New York AG appealed to Second Circuit Court of Appeals
• The Second Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that § 518 is just a regulation of pricing – a purely economic regulation that does not create any constitutional problem
• As a result, § 518 went back into effect
Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman

- Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Second Circuit’s decision
- March 2017: Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit’s ruling and remanded the case to the Second Circuit for consideration as a regulation of commercial speech
Credit Card Surcharges
New York Surcharge Ban – SCOTUS Ruling

Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman

• Supreme Court’s reasoning:
• **Dual Pricing** was legal under § 518
  • $10.00 Cash / $11.00 Credit
    • **Legal!**
  • $10.00 Cash, 10% CC Surcharge
    • **Illegal!**
• **Absolutely no economic difference between the two pricing schemes!**
Credit Card Surcharges
New York Surcharge Ban – SCOTUS Ruling

Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman
• Second Circuit’s ruling was vacated (as though it never happened)
• District Court’s ruling is effectively the law for the moment - § 518 has been ruled unconstitutional
• Second Circuit to evaluate § 518 as a regulation of commercial speech on remand, as applied to the “single price plus surcharge” pricing model
Credit Card Surcharges
New York Surcharge Ban – Effect of SCOTUS Ruling

Commercial Speech Doctrine
• A regulation of commercial speech, such as the New York and Texas surcharge bans, is only constitutionally permissible if
  • a **substantial governmental interest** is at stake
  • the regulation **directly advances** that interest
  • the regulation is **narrowly tailored** to the interest at stake
Credit Card Surcharges
Florida Surcharge Ban

*Dana’s Railroad Supply v. Bondi*

- Florida Statute 501.0117(1)–(2) made it a second-degree misdemeanor for a “seller or lessor in a sales or lease transaction” to “impose a surcharge on the buyer or lessee for electing to use a credit card.”
- Surcharge ban was upheld by United States District Court, Northern District Florida as a permissible economic regulation.
- United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed on First Amendment grounds – similar reasoning to SDNY District Court in *Expressions*.
- Several days after issuing its opinion in *Expressions*, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in *Dana’s*.
- As a result, Florida’s surcharge ban is dead and buried.
Credit Card Surcharges
Texas Surcharge Ban

Rowell v. Pettijohn

• Texas Financial Code § 339.001 prohibits “impos[ing] a surcharge on a buyer who uses a credit card . . . .”
• The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas held that § 339.001 was an economic regulation that “regulates only [the] prices charged” by sellers
• United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court in March 2016
• April 2017: Supreme Court summarily vacated the Fifth Circuit’s ruling and remanded the case for consideration pursuant to its holding in Expressions (i.e., as a regulation of commercial speech)
Credit Card Surcharges
Legal Concerns – American Express Settlement

American Express

• Historically: Amex contract required its cards to be treated the same as all other cards
• 2015 settlement would have permitted merchants to surcharge Amex transactions even if they did not surcharge debit card payments
• Settlement imploded after discovery that lead counsel allegedly gave confidential documents to counsel for MasterCard
Credit Card Surcharges
Legal Concerns – American Express Settlement

By Jonathan Randles

Law360, New York (February 12, 2015, 6:52 PM ET) -- Attorneys for Target Corp. and other retailers have opened a new line of attack on a proposed $79 million antitrust settlement over American Express Co.’s credit card rules, saying Thursday that the lead plaintiffs’ lawyer in the case provided protected information to MasterCard Inc.’s counsel at Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP.

Gary Friedman of Friedman Law LLP, a lead attorney representing a group of merchants that are suing AmEx, allegedly provided “protected materials” to Willkie, which represents MasterCard in the swipe fee case, according to a letter filed by lawyers representing a group of major U.S. retailers who have objected to the settlement.
SPEAKER BIOGRAPHIES
Speaker Bios
Wanda Borges, Esq. – Borges & Associates, LLC

Contact Information
E-Mail: wborges@borgeslawllc.com  
Phone: 516-677-8200 x225

Wanda Borges, the principal member of Borges & Associates, LLC, has specialized in commercial insolvency practice and commercial litigation representing corporate clients throughout the United States for over thirty years.

Wanda is admitted to practice before the courts of the State of New York and the United States District Courts for the Southern, Eastern, Northern, and Western Districts of New York, the District of Connecticut, and the Eastern District of Michigan, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the United States Supreme Court. She is a member of the American Bar Association, American Bankruptcy Institute, The Hispanic National Bar Association, The International Association of Commercial Collectors, International Women’s Insolvency and Restructuring Confederation, New York Institute of Credit and the Turnaround Management Association. She is a member and Past President of the Commercial Law League of America (CLLA), previously served as Chair of CLLA’s Bankruptcy Section, served for six years on the Executive Council of the Eastern Region of the CLLA, and currently serves as Chair of the Executive Council of the CLLA Creditors’ Rights Section.
Speaker Bios
Bruce S. Nathan, Esq. – Lowenstein Sandler LLP

Contact Information
E-Mail: bnathan@lowenstein.com
Phone: 212-204-8686

Bruce S. Nathan, Partner in Lowenstein Sandler’s Bankruptcy, Financial Reorganization & Creditors' Rights Group, has more than 30 years’ experience in the bankruptcy and insolvency field, and is a recognized national expert on trade creditor rights and the representation of trade creditors in bankruptcy and other legal matters. Bruce has represented trade and other unsecured creditors, unsecured creditors' committees, secured creditors, and other interested parties in many of the larger Chapter 11 cases that have been filed, and is currently representing the liquidating trust and previously represented the creditors’ committee in the Borders Group Inc. Chapter 11 case. Bruce also negotiates and prepares letters of credit, guarantees, security, consignment, bailment, tolling, and other agreements for the credit departments of institutional clients.

Bruce is co-chair of the Avoiding Powers Committee that is working with the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 and also participated in ABI's Great Debates at their 2010 Annual Spring Meeting, arguing against repeal of the special BAPCPA protections for goods providers and commercial lessors, and was a panelist for a session sponsored by the American Bankruptcy Institute ("ABI") and co-sponsored by Georgetown University Law Center. Bruce also regularly speaks at conferences held by the National Association of Credit Management, its international affiliate, An Association of Executives in Finance, Credit and International Business ("FCIB"), Credit Research Foundation ("CRF"), and many credit groups on bankruptcy, insolvency, and creditor’s rights issues; is a member of NACM's Government Affairs Committee, a regular contributor to NACM's Business Credit, a contributing editor of NACM’s Manual of Credit and Commercial Laws, and co-author of The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005: An Overhaul of U.S. Bankruptcy Law, published by NACM; and has contributed to CRF’s Journal, The Credit and Financial Management Review.

Bruce is recognized in the Bankruptcy & Creditor/Debtor Rights section of Super Lawyers (2012-2013) and in March 2011, he received the Top Hat Award, a prestigious annual award honoring extraordinary professionals in the credit industry.

Bruce is also a co-author of "Trade Creditor Remedies Manual: Trade Creditors’ Rights under the UCC and the U.S Bankruptcy Code" published by the American Bankruptcy Institute ("ABI") at the end of 2011, has contributed to the ABI Journal, and is a former member of ABI's Board of Directors and former Co-Chair of ABI's Unsecured Trade Creditors Committee.
Speaker Bios
Andrew Behlmann, Esq. – Lowenstein Sandler LLP

Contact Information
E-Mail: abehlmann@lowenstein.com
Phone: 973-597-2332

Andrew leverages his background in corporate finance and management to approach restructuring problems, both in and out of court, from a practical, results-oriented perspective. With a focus on building consensus among multiple parties that have competing priorities, Andrew is equally at home both in and out of the courtroom and has a track record of turning financial distress into positive business outcomes. Clients value his counsel in complex Chapter 11 cases, where he represents debtors, creditors’ committees, purchasers, and investors. Andrew writes and speaks frequently about bankruptcy matters and financial issues. Before becoming a lawyer, he worked in senior financial management at a midsized, privately held company.
Credit Card Surcharge Litigation Update

Impact of the Recent United States Supreme Court Decisions on Credit Card Surcharge Bans

NACM Webinar
May 1, 2017

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS

Presented By:

Wanda Borges, Esq.
Borges & Associates LLC
516-677-8200 x 225
wborges@borgeslawllc.com

Bruce S. Nathan, Esq.
Lowenstein Sandler LLP
212-204-8686
bnathan@lowenstein.com

Andrew Behlmann, Esq.
Lowenstein Sandler LLP
973-597-2332
abehlmann@lowenstein.com
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCOTUS and Technology Will Rule Credit Card Surcharge Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By: Wanda Borges, Esq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Supreme Court Questions Constitutionality of New York Credit Card Surcharge Ban as a Regulation of Commercial Speech</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Bruce Nathan, Esq. and Andrew Behlmann, Esq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>After Ruling in Expressions, Supreme Court Summarily Vacates Fifth Circuit Decision Upholding Texas Surcharge Prohibition and Denies Review of Eleventh Circuit Decision Striking Down Florida’s Surcharge Ban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Bruce Nathan, Esq. and Andrew Behlmann, Esq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supreme Court Rulings on Credit Card Surcharge Issues Disappointing, at Best</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By: Wanda Borges, Esq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker Biographies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Page 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Credit Card Surcharge Update
May 1, 2017
Fifteen years ago, commercial credit grantors never dreamed of passing through the cost of accepting credit cards from their customers. Many believed this to be illegal. As it turned out, it was perfectly legal, for the most part. The true crux of the problem was that most, if not all, contracts between the merchant and the credit card provider prohibited those costs from being passed on to the customer.

Credit Card Contract Issues Resolved

In 2005, several antitrust lawsuits were commenced against MasterCard, Visa and many of the providing banks on the basis that those parties were conspiring against the merchants and restraining their trades by prohibiting the pass-through of the surcharges which the banks required the merchants to pay for the ability to accept credit card payments. The litigation was granted class-action status and continued for many years, culminating in settlements in 2013 that were claimed to be the largest antitrust settlements ever. More than $7 billion was allocated to be shared with the class of plaintiffs in various forms.

Numerous appeals were subsequently filed and much confusion remains regarding whether surcharges to customers are really legal. The lawsuit may have been won, but that did not change the laws of the 10 states and Puerto Rico that maintained statutes prohibiting the passing through of surcharges to customers by merchants. This created even more confusion! There are two major issues with these statutes that continue to cause litigation and speculation.

It is unclear whether the existing statutes are intended for business-to-business transactions or only for business-to-consumer transactions.

Do These Statutes Apply to Consumer or Commercial Transactions?

It is unclear whether the existing statutes are intended for business-to-business transactions or only for business-to-consumer transactions. Most of the 10 states contain statutory language similar to the following: “No seller…or any credit card issuer may impose a surcharge on a card holder who elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check or similar means.” Three states—Colorado, Kansas and Maine—have adopted the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. California’s statute specifically uses the word “consumer.” Massachusetts’ statute is included under “Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure” rules. Oklahoma’s statute is contained under the title “Consumer Credit Code.” Texas’ prohibitions are governed by the Consumer Credit Commission. Puerto Rico’s statute specifically uses the word “consumer.” One would believe, therefore, that the credit card surcharge pass-through prohibition in these seven states and Puerto Rico impacts consumer credit transactions and not commercial transactions. The remaining three states—Florida, Maine and New York—have statutes which do not contain even a hint that they are limited to consumer transactions. What is also interesting to note is that when the Supreme Court heard argument on the surcharge issue (see below), the focus was on consumers.

Are These Statutes Unconstitutional?

There have been lawsuits filed in California, Florida, New York and Texas challenging the constitutionality and legality of the surcharge prohibition.

In a lawsuit titled Italian Colors Restaurant et al. v. Harris, the U.S. District Court in California declared the statute prohibiting the passing through of surcharges to be unconstitutional. That case has been appealed to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. To date, the 2nd, 5th and 11th Circuit Courts have issued decisions on the prohibitive statutes. The Circuits are split. The 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals upheld New York’s anti-surcharging law in Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman. The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals found Texas’ statute to be lawful (Lowell v. Pettijohn). The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals in Dana’s R.R. Supply found Florida’s anti-surcharge law unlawful because it violated merchants’ First Amendment free speech rights.
SCOTUS Oral Arguments
On Jan. 10, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument on the Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman case. A decision in this case will also impact the 5th Circuit decision, which is on hold pending the ruling in Expressions Hair Design.

The focus was on whether or not the New York statute violates the First Amendment right of free speech with little focus on whether or not surcharge pass-through is or is not legal or whether it should be allowed. Counsel for the Petitioner (Hair Design) opened his argument by saying, “This case is about whether the state may criminalize truthful speech that merchants believe is their most effective way of communicating the hidden cost of credit cards to their customers.” This is at issue because, while the New York statute and other state statutes prohibit charging a customer an additional surcharge when paying by credit card, those same statutes permit a merchant/vendor to give a discount to a customer who pays with cash. Counsel tried to persuade the justices that the merchant who wishes to truthfully tell customers that the same product will cost more if paid by credit card is punished for doing so while another merchant that tells its customers that the same product will cost less if paid by cash is rewarded. In either instance, the customer has the same pricing information. “[Y]ou can charge the two different prices, one for cash, one for credit, but what runs afoul of the law is describing the price difference one way as a surcharge versus a credit,” the attorney said.

The justices seemed to understand the basic concept that: “Some consumers are going to pay more; some consumers are going to pay less.” However, in trying to pin down counsel as to why the statute was a violation on free speech, Justice Samuel Alito said, “If it’s okay to post the higher price and nothing more, and if the higher price is the credit card price, they are forcing the merchant to speak in a particular way.” Justice Sonia Sotomayor also interjected, “I just don’t see anything about speech in the statute…. To me, it’s very simple: One price for everything.” She continued by saying, “I’m hard pressed to see if that’s the interpretation given to what I view as the plain meaning of the statute, that that would be unconstitutional.”

The U. S. attorney suggested that the Supreme Court should send the case back down to New York to let its judges decide clearly what the statute intends.

Counsel for the respondents countered the petitioner by saying, “The plain text of New York’s statute refers only to a pricing practice and not to any speech…the application of the statute is straightforward. The seller may not add to its listed prices and instead must adhere to those prices if a customer decides to pay by using a credit card.” Justices similarly interrupted the attorney’s prepared argument, peppering him with the same kinds of questions they had thrown at the petitioner’s counsel.

The lightest moment during the arguments came when Justice Alito posited, “Suppose some kids have a lemonade stand or they’re washing cars and they say a glass of lemonade is $1. Then somebody comes up to them and says, ‘I’d like to buy that with a credit card.’ It might happen today. That would be a violation if they put the $1 there on the assumption that everybody is going to pay cash for their lemonade. These are tech-savvy kids, so they could process a credit card purchase if they wanted to.” All present laughed at the response that there was no exception for kids selling lemonade.

The decision by the Supreme Court will, I am sure, be a most interesting read. Will it solve the problem? That is the question which remains to be answered.

Technology Has Wreaked Havoc on the Antitrust Settlements
The class-action antitrust lawsuits are now under attack because of the wrongdoing of some attorneys. In December 2014, one of the attorneys representing MasterCard in the Antitrust Surcharge litigation was arrested and charged with conspiracy with an opposing attorney to defraud two law firms and a client of several million dollars. The former law firm discovered several confidential documents in counsel’s possession relating to American Express. In February 2015, the firm notified the parties and the court that the elements of procedural and substantive fairness required in relation to approval of the proposed settlement may have been compromised. All federal courts permit and even mandate electronic filing of court documents. So it is no surprise that the same technology that permits one to save time and the expense of paper copies and mailing will also be the technology that nails you. Technology led to the downfall of the two attorneys and the American Express settlement. An email was discovered between the two containing attachments with the confidential documents and a statement at the end of the email which said “burn after reading.” Both law firms have been thrown off the case. One of the attorneys was indicted in November 2015. The criminal prosecution against that counsel is ongoing as of this writing.

As a result, the American Express surcharge litigation is ongoing and there is risk that the MasterCard/Visa settlements could unravel.

There is no question that merchants are moving forward with ways to pass through their surcharges. The use of technology will enable those merchants to discern between states where they can do so and those where a prohibition still remains. As to the antitrust litigation, whatever the outcome in court, it will not likely change the way the credit card companies are doing business today. Thus, surcharging pass-through is here to stay in one way or another.

“This is reprinted from Business Credit magazine, a publication of the National Association of Credit Management. This article may not be forwarded electronically or reproduced in any way without written permission from the Editor of Business Credit magazine.
On March 29, 2017, in a potential, or at least temporary, victory for the plaintiffs in Expressions Hair Design et al. v. Schneiderman, the United States Supreme Court ruled that New York’s credit card surcharge ban regulates speech, not pricing. The Supreme Court vacated the June 2016 decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which had upheld the statute as a constitutional regulation of pricing, and remanded the case to the Second Circuit with instructions to instead analyze the statute as a commercial speech regulation.

The statute at issue, New York General Business Law § 518, provides that “No seller in any sales transaction may impose a surcharge on a holder who elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar means.” Violations of § 518 carry misdemeanor criminal penalties of a fine of up to $500, imprisonment up to one year (!), or both.

Merchants accepting payments by credit card typically pay fees of approximately 1% to 5% of the amount of the transaction, depending on a number of factors, such as the brand and type of card, the nature of the merchant’s business, and the amount of the transaction. The Expressions plaintiffs, a group of New York merchants, wanted to offset their cost of accepting credit cards by imposing a surcharge on customers who pay by credit card. Visa and MasterCard historically prohibited merchants from imposing surcharges for credit card payments, thus rendering state statutes such as § 518 redundant. However, a 2012 anti-trust settlement (currently being re-engineered after being overturned on appeal) led to modifications in the Visa and MasterCard network rules to permit merchants to pass the cost of card acceptance onto customers through a surcharge at the point of payment. This change promptly brought a handful of state statutes banning credit card surcharges, such as § 518, back into the news and the courts.

Although § 518 prohibits merchants from adding surcharges to credit card transactions, it does not preclude merchants from raising prices across the board and offering a discount for payment by cash or check. For instance, under § 518, charging $20.00 for a product and adding a $1.00 surcharge for credit card payments would be forbidden, but charging $21.00 for the same product and offering a $1.00 discount for cash or check payment would not. In either instance, however, the fundamental economic reality is exactly the same: a customer paying for the product in cash will pay $20.00, while a customer paying for the same product with a credit card will pay $21.00.

The Expressions plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the New York Attorney General in June 2013 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking two forms of relief: first, a declaration that § 518 is unconstitutional and preempted by other federal laws, and second, an injunction preventing the state from enforcing the statute. The plaintiffs asserted, among other things, that § 518 unconstitutionally restricts the manner in which they can communicate their pricing to customers. In the hypothetical scenario above, customers would pay the exact same prices under either the (forbidden) surcharge arrangement or the (permissible) discount structure. The only difference is in the words used to define the two pricing schemes. That seemingly arbitrary distinction, the plaintiffs argued, infringed on their First Amendment rights. The merchants – for obvious reasons – wanted the ability to maintain and post their usual prices, but charge an additional fee for credit card payments to properly reflect the added costs imposed by the credit card networks.

The merchants prevailed in the District Court. That court adopted the merchants’ view that, among other infirmities, § 518 is unconstitutional because it impermissibly regulates speech by drawing an arbitrary distinction between the words “discount” and “surcharge” even though there is no difference whatsoever between the economic realities of the two pricing structures.

The Second Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that § 518 is not unconstitutional. Rather, the Second Circuit ruled that § 518 is simply a pricing regulation and that it is “far from clear” that the statute prohibits a dual pricing scheme (i.e., posting separate prices for cash and credit, as opposed to a single price plus a surcharge for a particular mode of payment). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Second Circuit’s decision.

In the Supreme Court, the merchants waived a facial challenge to the overall constitutionality of § 518, and instead challenged the statute only as it has been or could be applied to them in one particular pricing scenario: posting a single cash price and an additional credit card surcharge (either as a percentage of the price or a fixed amount). The Supreme Court agreed with the Second Circuit’s determination that § 518 would bar this type of pricing arrangement. However, the Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit’s holding that § 518 is simply a pricing regulation and instead held that § 518 regulates speech because it regulates “the communication of prices rather than prices themselves ...” (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court’s determination that § 518 regulates commercial speech is not the end of the story. While some commentators have predicted that the Expressions plaintiffs have a strong chance of prevailing on remand, the Supreme Court did not offer any insight on whether § 518 is a constitutional regulation of commercial speech. The commercial speech doctrine is not as well-developed as the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding individual speech, nor are the protections as robust. The Supreme Court first ruled in 1976 that commercial speech is entitled to some level of First Amendment protection, holding that commercial speech may not be banned in its entirety. In 1980, the Court announced a three-step test for ascertaining the constitutionality of regulations of commercial speech. Under that test, a statute that regulates commercial speech, such as § 518, is only constitutionally permissible if (1) a substantial governmental interest is at stake, (2) the speech regulation at issue directly advances that substantial governmental interest, and (3) the regulation is narrowly tailored – that is, no more extensive than necessary to advance that interest. In 1989, the Court refined the “narrowly tailored” prong of the test, providing that the regulation must bear a “reasonable fit” to the governmental interest it serves.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Second Circuit to consider the constitutionality of § 518 as a regulation of commercial speech, as applied to the “single price plus surcharge” arrangement described above. Under the commercial speech doctrine, the Second Circuit can only uphold § 518 if it first finds that prohibiting such a pricing regime serves a substantial governmental interest, and then finds that the prohibition in § 518 bears a reasonable fit in furtherance of that interest.

The Attorney General will likely assert on remand, consistent with prior arguments in the Expressions litigation, that § 518 serves a substantial governmental interest by protecting consumers from being misled by merchants’ advertised prices, only to learn at the time of payment that they will be charged an added fee for paying by credit card. It is difficult to fathom consumers requiring “protection” from a modest surcharge, particularly where the applicable Visa and MasterCard rules require clear signage advising consumers of it at the point of sale – and where consumers have the option not to proceed with a purchase if they dislike the surcharge. Absent a threshold finding that § 518 serves a substantial governmental interest, such as consumer protection, the statute would not survive the plaintiffs’ challenge. However, if the Second Circuit does find that § 518 serves the substantial governmental interest of consumer protection (or otherwise), it very likely would also find that the statute furthers and bears a “reasonable fit” to that interest, and thus satisfies the other two prongs of the constitutional standard.

In light of the Supreme Court’s directive to consider § 518 as a speech regulation, it is entirely possible that the Second Circuit will reverse its prior holding on remand and will instead uphold the District Court’s determination that § 518 is unconstitutional as applied to the “single price plus surcharge” pricing arrangement. It is also possible that the Second Circuit will follow the admonition in the concurring opinions that the Supreme Court should have remanded the case back to the Second Circuit with an instruction to certify to the New York Court of Appeals the question of how § 518 operates: that is, which pricing schemes, if any, § 518 would permit and which it would prohibit. However, as other commentators have noted, the Supreme Court’s opinion contains so little guidance on the underlying First Amendment issues that there is no guarantee of what the Second Circuit will do on remand.

Two additional petitions for certiorari are pending in the Supreme Court with respect to conflicting decisions by the Fifth Circuit, which upheld the Texas surcharge ban as a constitutional pricing regulation, and the Eleventh Circuit, which struck down the Florida surcharge ban as an unconstitutional restriction on merchants’ speech. In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Expressions, it is possible that the Court will summarily reverse the Fifth Circuit with similar instructions to consider the Texas statute as a speech regulation. Granting certiorari in the Eleventh Circuit case, which considered Florida’s surcharge ban as a speech regulation, would provide the Supreme Court an opportunity to expand on the application of the commercial speech doctrine to such regulations.

In summary, if the Second Circuit strikes down § 518, at least as applied to the pricing scheme at issue in Expressions, the takeaway for merchants accepting credit cards from customers located in New York (debates regarding the applicability of § 518 to B2B transactions aside) will be that § 518 will no longer prohibit the posting of a single price and the imposition of a surcharge atop that price for payment by credit card. Time will tell whether that is the outcome here.

About the authors:

Bruce S. Nathan, Partner in the firm’s Bankruptcy, Financial Reorganization & Creditors’ Rights Department, has more than 30 years experience in the bankruptcy and insolvency field, and is a recognized national expert on trade creditor rights and the representation of trade creditors in bankruptcy and other legal matters.

Andrew Behlmann applies his legal and financial expertise in complex Chapter 11 cases, where he represents debtors, creditors’ committees, purchasers, and investors. He writes and speaks frequently about bankruptcy matters and financial issues. Before becoming a lawyer, he worked in senior financial management at a midsized, privately held company.
After Ruling in Expressions, Supreme Court Summarily Vacates Fifth Circuit Decision Upholding Texas Surcharge Prohibition and Denies Review of Eleventh Circuit Decision Striking Down Florida’s Surcharge Ban

By Bruce Nathan, Esq. and Andrew Behlmann, Esq.
Lowenstein Sandler LLP

Editor’s note: The companion article on this subject, published in the 1Q 2017 CRF News, may be accessed HERE.

On March 29, 2017, the United States Supreme Court issued its long-awaited decision in Expressions Hair Design, et al. v. Schneiderman, holding that New York’s prohibition against surcharging credit card transactions is a regulation of commercial speech and remanding the case to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals for further consideration as such.

On Monday, April 3, 2017, the Supreme Court ruled on petitions for certiorari in the two other surcharge-related cases that were pending before it.

In Rowell et al. v. Pettijohn, a group of merchants sought review of a decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which – like the Second Circuit in Expressions – held in early 2016 that the Texas surcharge ban is a constitutionally permissible regulation of pricing. On Monday, the Supreme Court granted the merchants’ petition, summarily (i.e., immediately and with no further briefing or argument by the parties) vacated the Fifth Circuit’s decision, and remanded the case back to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Expressions.

In Bondi v. Dana’s Railroad Supply, et al., the Florida Attorney General sought review of a decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which held in late 2015 that Florida’s surcharge ban is a facially unconstitutional regulation of merchants’ speech. The Supreme Court denied the state’s petition for a writ of certiorari, leaving the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling intact. As a result, the Florida surcharge ban has effectively been overturned in its entirety.

Denial of certiorari in Dana’s means the Supreme Court will not have an opportunity to provide further guidance on the application of the commercial speech doctrine to credit card surcharge bans unless and until another case – possibly even Expressions or Rowell, depending upon the outcome in those cases on remand – comes up from the Courts of Appeals. However, the Dana’s decision at least suggests that the Supreme Court is receptive to the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning, and is a knockout punch for Florida merchants, whose surcharging fight is now over unless and until the Florida legislature decides to craft a new surcharge ban.

About the authors:

Bruce S. Nathan, Partner in the firm’s Bankruptcy, Financial Reorganization & Creditors’ Rights Department, has more than 30 years experience in the bankruptcy and insolvency field, and is a recognized national expert on trade creditor rights and the representation of trade creditors in bankruptcy and other legal matters.

Andrew Behlmann applies his legal and financial expertise in complex Chapter 11 cases, where he represents debtors, creditors’ committees, purchasers, and investors.

He writes and speaks frequently about bankruptcy matters and financial issues. Before becoming a lawyer, he worked in senior financial management at a midsized, privately held company.
The long-awaited decision by the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) is disappointing to merchants, credit grantors and credit card networks alike. It was hoped that a strong decision by SCOTUS would resolve the question as to whether individual state laws prohibiting the pass through of credit card surcharges are unconstitutional, and therefore, illegal.

With the settlement of the MasterCard/Visa antitrust litigation and the rule changes by MasterCard, Visa, Discover and American Express, merchants excitedly looked forward to passing through their credit card surcharges to their customers. A rapid examination into various state laws, however, left merchants frustrated as they realized that 10 states plus Puerto Rico had laws prohibiting those merchants from passing their surcharges on to their customers. The dust had barely settled on the rule changes by MasterCard and Visa when several lawsuits were commenced challenging the anti-surcharge laws of California, Florida, Texas and New York.

The first case to be filed was Expressions Hair Design, et al v. Eric T. Schneiderman in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. That case was commenced for a determination that New York State's General Business Law §518 is unconstitutional, vague and in violation of the First Amendment right to freedom of speech. New York's anti-surcharge law says “[n]o seller in any sales transaction may impose a surcharge on a holder who elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash.” The primary argument in the case was that a merchant could readily offer a discount for a cash payment but was prohibited from imposing a surcharge for a payment made by credit card. In determining that the New York anti-surcharge law is unconstitutional Judge Rakoff said that, “[i]n terms of their immediate economic consequences, surcharges and discounts are merely different labels for the same thing—a price difference between cash and credit.” He said further that, “[t]his virtually incomprehensible distinction between what a vendor can and cannot tell its customers offends the First Amendment and renders Section 518 unconstitutional.” On appeal, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that New York's law is neither unconstitutional nor does it violate a merchant's freedom of speech. The 2nd Circuit decided that this anti-surcharge issue addressed price regulations which govern conduct and that freedom of speech has nothing to do with this statute. The case then moved on to the Supreme Court of the United States. In reading the transcript from oral argument which was held on January 10, it was apparent to me that the Supreme Court Justices were struggling to understand the arguments before them. Counsel for the Petitioner seemed unable to frame the issues well enough to persuade the Justices that the case was about freedom of speech. He said that merchants who were truthful to their customers and announce that a different price will be charged for cash or credit were being punished for honestly giving those customers both prices. His statement “[y]ou can charge the two different prices, one for cash, one for credit, but what runs afoul of the law is describing the price one way as a surcharge versus a credit.” The Justices did not seem to agree and Justice Sotomayor even said that she did not “see anything about speech in the statute.” In the opinion, however, delivered by Chief Justice John Roberts, he stated succinctly “The question presented is whether §518 regulates merchants' speech and—if so—whether the statute violates the First Amendment. We conclude that §518 does regulate speech and remand for the Court of Appeals to determine in the first instance whether that regulation is unconstitutional.” In an earlier article, after initially reading the transcript, I
suggested that SCOTUS was not going to solve the surcharge issue. Unfortunately, I was right!

This decision has prolonged the agony of merchants who are trying to obtain a clear ruling on whether or not the various states can prohibit surcharging.

Florida’s lawsuit concerning its anti-surcharge law has also been stymied by the Supreme Court. Yet, this lawsuit’s current standing is favorable to merchants. The case of Bondi v Dana’s RR Supply was commenced for a determination that Florida’s nearly 30-year-old surcharge statute is a facially unconstitutional speech restriction. The federal trial court in Florida held that the Florida statute is constitutional and only governs conduct, a completely opposite position from Judge Rakoff in New York. However, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals held that Florida’s law is unconstitutional. This matter was also taken to the Supreme Court of the United States. In June 2016, Bondi, as the attorney general for the State of Florida petitioned the Supreme Court to hear this matter. The Supreme Court delayed deciding whether to hear the Florida case while it was considering the New York case as it perceived the issues to be virtually identical. It was well-known that the SCOTUS decision in Hair Expressions would impact the Dana’s RR Supply case. Sure enough, the Hair Expressions case was decided on March 28, 2017 and on April 3, 2017, SCOTUS denied the petition to be heard filed by Bondi. What this means is that Florida’s anti-surcharge law has been found to be unconstitutional and surcharge pass through is therefore permissible in the State of Florida.

The other lawsuits on this issue are less exciting. The case of Italian Colors Restaurant et al. v. Harris was commenced in California and the federal district court found the anti-surcharge statute to be unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement. That case has been appealed to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals but has not yet been decided.

The case of Lowell v. Pettijohn was commenced in Texas. In this case, most like the Hair Expressions case, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Texas’s no-surcharge law “regulates conduct, not speech, and, therefore, does not implicate the First Amendment.” Like Hair Expressions, this case raised the constitutional question: “Do state no-surcharge laws—which allow merchants to offer “discounts” to those who pay in cash but prohibit them from imposing equivalent “surcharges” on those who pay by credit card—violate the First Amendment?” While SCOTUS was considering the Hair Expressions case, it held the petition to hear the Lowell v. Pettijohn case in abeyance. On April 3, 2017 SCOTUS denied the petition to be heard. Unlike the Florida case, however, which was simply denied by SCOTUS, the Texas case was “remanded for further consideration” in light of the SCOTUS decision in the Hair Expressions case.

What all of this means is that the litigation concerning the Texas, New York and California statutes will continue. The SCOTUS decision was so scant in terms of any actual discussion of the issues that no lower court can rely on the SCOTUS decision to shed any light on what the lower courts should or should not do relative to the anti-surcharges statutes. The merchant’s battles against the anti-surcharge laws in Texas, California and New York are far from over. SCOTUS did nothing to give credit grantors and merchants a clear directive as to how they can differentiate in price between cash and credit transactions.

Nevertheless, more and more businesses are accepting credit card payments. It is incumbent on the credit grantor, therefore, to remain cognizant of the laws in the various states that currently prohibit the pass through of surcharges while watching for future news on litigation concerning these statutes.

Wanda Borges, Esq., member of Borges & Associates LLC, specializes in commercial law and creditors’ rights. She is also a frequent expert speaker NACM events throughout the country and via webinars. She can be reached at wborges@borgeslawLLC.com.
SPEAKER BIOGRAPHIES
Speaker Bios
Wanda Borges, Esq. – Borges & Associates, LLC

Contact Information
E-Mail: wborges@borgeslawllc.com
Phone: 516-677-8200 x225

Wanda Borges, the principal member of Borges & Associates, LLC, has specialized in commercial insolvency practice and commercial litigation representing corporate clients throughout the United States for over thirty years.

Wanda is admitted to practice before the courts of the State of New York and the United States District Courts for the Southern, Eastern, Northern, and Western Districts of New York, the District of Connecticut, and the Eastern District of Michigan, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the United States Supreme Court. She is a member of the American Bar Association, American Bankruptcy Institute, The Hispanic National Bar Association, The International Association of Commercial Collectors, International Women’s Insolvency and Restructuring Confederation, New York Institute of Credit and the Turnaround Management Association. She is a member and Past President of the Commercial Law League of America (CLLA), previously served as Chair of CLLA’s Bankruptcy Section, served for six years on the Executive Council of the Eastern Region of the CLLA, and currently serves as Chair of the Executive Council of the CLLA Creditors’ Rights Section.
Speaker Bios
Bruce S. Nathan, Esq. – Lowenstein Sandler LLP

Contact Information
E-Mail: bnathan@lowenstein.com
Phone: 212-204-8686

Bruce S. Nathan, Partner in Lowenstein Sandler’s Bankruptcy, Financial Reorganization & Creditors’ Rights Group, has more than 30 years’ experience in the bankruptcy and insolvency field, and is a recognized national expert on trade creditor rights and the representation of trade creditors in bankruptcy and other legal matters. Bruce has represented trade and other unsecured creditors, unsecured creditors’ committees, secured creditors, and other interested parties in many of the larger Chapter 11 cases that have been filed, and is currently representing the liquidating trust and previously represented the creditors’ committee in the Borders Group Inc. Chapter 11 case. Bruce also negotiates and prepares letters of credit, guarantees, security, consignment, bailment, tolling, and other agreements for the credit departments of institutional clients.

Bruce is co-chair of the Avoiding Powers Committee that is working with the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 and also participated in ABI’s Great Debates at their 2010 Annual Spring Meeting, arguing against repeal of the special BAPCPA protections for goods providers and commercial lessors, and was a panelist for a session sponsored by the American Bankruptcy Institute (‘ABI’) and co-sponsored by Georgetown University Law Center. Bruce also regularly speaks at conferences held by the National Association of Credit Management, its international affiliate, An Association of Executives in Finance, Credit and International Business (‘FCIB’), Credit Research Foundation (‘CRF’), and many credit groups on bankruptcy, insolvency, and creditor’s rights issues; is a member of NACM’s Government Affairs Committee, a regular contributor to NACM’s Business Credit, a contributing editor of NACM’s Manual of Credit and Commercial Laws, and co-author of The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005: An Overhaul of U.S. Bankruptcy Law, published by NACM; and has contributed to CRF’s Journal, The Credit and Financial Management Review.

Bruce is recognized in the Bankruptcy & Creditor/Debtor Rights section of Super Lawyers (2012-2013) and in March 2011, he received the Top Hat Award, a prestigious annual award honoring extraordinary professionals in the credit industry.

Bruce is also a co-author of “Trade Creditor Remedies Manual: Trade Creditors’ Rights under the UCC and the U.S Bankruptcy Code” published by the American Bankruptcy Institute (‘ABI’) at the end of 2011, has contributed to the ABI Journal, and is a former member of ABI’s Board of Directors and former Co-Chair of ABI’s Unsecured Trade Creditors Committee.
Speaker Bios
Andrew Behlmann, Esq. – Lowenstein Sandler LLP

Contact Information
E-Mail: abehlmann@lowenstein.com
Phone: 973-597-2332

Andrew leverages his background in corporate finance and management to approach restructuring problems, both in and out of court, from a practical, results-oriented perspective. With a focus on building consensus among multiple parties that have competing priorities, Andrew is equally at home both in and out of the courtroom and has a track record of turning financial distress into positive business outcomes. Clients value his counsel in complex Chapter 11 cases, where he represents debtors, creditors’ committees, purchasers, and investors. Andrew writes and speaks frequently about bankruptcy matters and financial issues. Before becoming a lawyer, he worked in senior financial management at a midsized, privately held company.